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This study explores electoral accountability at the devolved level in Wales. The retrospective 
voting model assumes that electoral accountability requires that citizens assign responsibility 
accurately and vote on the basis of their evaluation of government performance. Drawing on 
data from the 2016 Welsh Election Study, we examine whether citizens in Wales can identify 
devolved policy competences and office holders, and identify factors that are linked to 
accurate attributions. We then examine whether voters seek to use devolved elections as a 
sanctioning tool, even if they do not have the information required to do so accurately. The 
findings indicate that there is an acute accountability deficit at the devolved level in Wales: 
few have the knowledge or the inclination to hold those in power to account. The conclusion 
discusses the implications of these findings for democracy in Wales and in other multi-level 
settings. 
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According to the retrospective voting model, a key function of elections is to provide citizens 
with an opportunity to hold those in power responsible for their performance (Fiorina, 1981). 
Citizens may re-elect incumbents who have performed strongly and dismiss office holders 
who have performed poorly. Yet citizens are not always able to use elections to sanction in 
this way (Anderson, 2006; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). For elections to work as an effective 
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sanctioning tool, citizens must be able to attribute responsibility for policy performance 
accurately and those attributions must inform voting behaviour (Arceneaux, 2006). In many 
settings, fulfilling these requirements asks a great deal of citizens. They must be able to 
identify which governmental institutions are responsible for specific policy areas and which 
party(s) holds power within those institutions; citizens must also be informed sufficiently to 
be able to evaluate policy performance at least at a rudimentary level and they must vote on 
the basis of these evaluations (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Garry, 2014). Citizens are 
unable to use elections to hold those in power responsible for their record if they fail to 
identify who deserves the credit or blame for policy outcomes and/or fail to take government 
performance into account when voting (Cutler, 2017). It is well established that citizens in 
many settings cannot attribute responsibility accurately (e.g. Cutler, 2004; Gomez and 
Wilson, 2008; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014) and/or fail to draw on their attributions when voting 
(e.g. Arceneaux, 2006; Johns, 2011). 
 
Issues relating to responsibility attributions warrant particular attention in the context of the 
devolved level in Wales. The Welsh public was promised that devolution would revitalize 
democracy in Wales by bringing government ‘closer to the people’ (HC Deb 22 July 1997, 
c757). The composition of government would be closely aligned with public preferences in 
Wales; accountability would be stronger since citizens would more easily be able to hold 
those in power responsible for government performance (Chaney et al., 2001). Two decades 
following the 1997 referendum on devolution, the state of electoral accountability in Wales 
has not been subjected to detailed scholarly attention and so it remains unclear whether these 
promises have been realised. Politicians (BBCNews, 2012) and scholars (Cushion and Scully, 
2016) have long voiced concerns regarding the strength of electoral accountability in 
devolved Wales. Concern centres on the issue of whether voters possess sufficient knowledge 
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to make effective use of their vote at devolved elections. Given the paucity of empirical 
evidence on public understanding of devolution, an examination of whether citizens in Wales 
can use their vote to hold the increasingly powerful devolved office holders to account is long 
overdue. 
 
This article investigates the strength of accountability at devolved elections in Wales. We 
start, in Section 1, by reviewing the literature on responsibility attributions and by discussing 
the factors that make the task of attributing responsibility challenging for citizens. In Section 
2, we provide an overview of the key themes in the development of Welsh devolution that 
may affect the accuracy of attributions, and discuss the relevance of Wales as a case study. 
Section 3 outlines the study’s aims and presents the 2016 Welsh Election Study (WES), the 
data source explored in subsequent sections. Three empirical sections follow, each examining 
a distinct issue relating to responsibility attribution and voting behaviour. In Section 4 we 
examine the extent to which Welsh voters attribute responsibility accurately: in terms of 
identifying at which level of government responsibility for key policy areas lies (cf. 
Arceneaux, 2006) and in terms of identifying the partisan composition of government (cf. 
Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). This is basic knowledge that citizens must possess to 
sanction or reward office holders. In Section 5 we investigate whether some groups face 
particular difficulties in attributing responsibility. We do this by presenting multivariate 
models which identify factors linked to (in)accurate responsibility attributions (cf. Johns, 
2011). Section 6 explores whether citizens in Wales draw on their attributions when voting 
(cf. Arceneaux, 2006), regardless of whether they assign responsibility accurately. This tells 
us whether citizens seek to use their vote to reward or sanction office holders, even if they 
lack the required knowledge. The conclusion considers the implications of the findings, for 
Wales and more broadly. 
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This study contributes to the emerging literature on Welsh devolution. It identifies whether 
devolution has delivered on the promise of strong electoral accountability and tests the 
prevalent claim that electoral accountability in Wales is weak. Further, the examination of 
whether some groups face particular difficulties in attributing responsibility informs debates 
on how to improve public understanding of devolution. Given the peculiarities of the Welsh 
case study (see Section 2), the article provides a basis for making a contribution to 
understanding of responsibility attribution more broadly. We present evidence on how 
citizens respond to the challenge of attributing responsibility in a setting where constitutional 
change is frequent and the consumption of indigenous news media is limited. 
 
1. A Review of the Literature on Responsibility Attributions and Electoral 
Accountability 
How citizens attribute responsibility for policy outcomes plays a crucial role in determining 
whether elections serve as an effective sanctioning mechanism. 1  According to the 
retrospective voting model, citizens use elections to reward or sanction those in power for 
their performance in office (Fiorina, 1981); electoral accountability is strongest when there is 
a close link between performance evaluations and vote choice. A key assumption 
underpinning the retrospective voting model is that citizens attribute responsibility for 
outcomes to the appropriate political actor(s) and draw on these attributions when voting 
(Cutler, 2004; Arceneaux, 2006; Rudolph, 2006). Citizens must evaluate policy outcomes and 
sanction or reward those – and only those – who are responsible for the outcomes in question 
(Anderson, 2006, p. 450). In other words, to hold their elected office holders to account for 
                                                
1 There is a vast literature on forms of accountability other than electoral accountability. For a 
discussion on how changes in decision making patterns and multi-level governance have 
given rise to new forms and understandings of accountability see e.g. Papadopoulus (2007). 
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their past performance citizens must engage in ‘attribution-sensitive retrospective 
performance based voting’ (Garry, 2014, p. 87). Citizens who misattribute responsibility are 
liable to reward or sanction the ‘wrong’ office holder; voters who fail to draw on their 
attributions when deciding how to vote do not engage in retrospective voting. With these 
considerations in mind, scholars have examined whether and under what conditions citizens 
attribute responsibility accurately and draw on these attributions when voting. Institutional 
and individual-level factors have been identified as making the task of attributing 
responsibility more challenging for citizens, as discussed below. 
 
The complexity of the institutional environment has been identified as a major factor 
undermining citizens’ efforts to attribute responsibility. In systems of multi-level governance, 
responsibility is dispersed ‘vertically’ between institutions operating at different levels2, and 
citizens must identify at which level different functions are carried out. In addition to the 
increased information costs that citizens face, governments at different levels have an 
incentive to mislead citizens by shifting blame and taking credit (Anderson, 2006, p. 449). 
The difficulties for citizens are most acute in settings where power is shared between levels, 
along the lines of the marble cake model rather than the layer cake model of federalism 
(León, 2012; Cutler, 2017).3 Studies of multi-level settings demonstrate that citizens struggle 
to judge accurately which level of governance is responsible for various functions (Cutler, 
2004; Gomez and Wilson, 2008; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Even in settings where voters can 
                                                
2 The literature differentiates between the ‘vertical’ and the ‘horizontal’ dispersion of 
responsibility. The ‘vertical’ dispersion of responsibility refers to the dispersion of power 
between different levels of governance. The ‘horizontal’ dispersion of responsibility refers to 
the dispersion of power between actors on the same level of governance. 
3 In settings where the ‘layer cake’ model applies, responsibility over specific policy areas 
lies exclusively at specific levels and therefore it is clear which level has responsibility for a 
given policy area. In settings where ‘the marble cake’ model applies, it is more difficult to 
identify which level is primarily responsible for a given policy area because responsibility is 
shared between different levels. 
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attribute responsibility accurately, there is limited (Cutler, 2017), or no (Johns, 2011), 
evidence that citizens draw on these attributions when deciding how to vote. Retrospective 
voting is weaker in multi-level settings than in unitary systems (Anderson, 2006). The 
promise of decentralisation – that citizens find it easier to hold those in power to account – 
goes unfulfilled in many settings; politicians in multi-level settings appear to be ‘less, not 
more, accountable for their actions’ (Arceneaux, 2006: 731). 
 
Considerations relating to the ‘horizontal’ division of power can also complicate the task of 
attributing responsibility. Factors such as the lack of voting unity within governmental 
parties, the presence of a bicameral opposition and a strong committee system have the effect 
of dispersing power and reducing governmental clarity (Powell and Whitten 1993). Network 
governance, the increasingly common practice whereby social actors play a crucial role in the 
design and implementation of services, has a similar effect (Papadopoulos, 2007). In multi-
party systems, power is often shared horizontally between parties forming a coalition 
government. In such settings, citizens must identify which of the governing parties bears 
principal responsibility for performance in specific areas (Fisher and Hobolt, 2010). Many 
citizens fail at these tasks (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). Citizens under multi-party 
governments find it more difficult to hold those in power to account: retrospective voting is 
less prevalent under coalition governments than in two-party systems (Fisher and Hobolt, 
2010).  
 
Individual-level factors can also affect voters’ ability to make accurate attributions. Bias can 
lead citizens to misattribute responsibility. It can also lead citizens to identify one political 
actor as being responsible for governmental performance in a given area (functional 
responsibility) yet to credit or blame another actor for those outcomes (causal responsibility) 
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(Arceneaux, 2006). Predispositions, most notably partisanship, can act as a ‘perceptual 
screen’ which conditions how citizens evaluate outcomes and assign responsibility for those 
outcomes. Party supporters tend to credit their party for policy successes while shifting blame 
away for policy failures (Rudolph 2006; Marsh and Tilley, 2010). Constitutional preference 
is another factor that can lead voters to engage in motivated responsibility attribution. Hobolt 
and Tilley find that ‘EU supporters are more likely to claim responsibility for the EU when 
things are going well and less likely to say that the EU is responsible when things are going 
badly’ (2014, p. 6). It is clear that several sources of bias impedes voters’ efforts to assign 
responsibility and blame. 
 
Political knowledge is another individual-level factor which shapes whether voters can 
attribute responsibility accurately, and in turn, whether they can use their vote in an informed 
manner. Citizens require information about the institutional environment and about policy 
outcomes if they are to attribute responsibility accurately and draw on these attributions when 
voting (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014: p. 18). Those with limited political knowledge tend to draw 
on cues when making political decisions. While these can sometimes be successfully used 
(Sniderman et al., 1991), they often mislead citizens (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001). Those with 
limited political knowledge are therefore in a weaker position to make effective use of their 
vote. 
 
Media consumption can assist citizens to attribute responsibility, but it can also be a 
hindrance. While media reports can provide valuable information, they can also be inaccurate 
or misleading, or they can prompt individuals to draw on their biases (Hobolt and Tilley, 
2014, ch. 5; Maestas et al., 2008). Empirical findings relating to the effect of media 
consumption on responsibility attributions are mixed. Reading newspapers leads Scottish 
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voters to misattribute devolved responsibilities to the UK level (Johns, 2011, p. 66). Media 
consumption has no general effect on the accuracy of responsibility judgments relating to the 
EU (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014, chs. 5–6). Cutler (2017) finds that judgments are more accurate 
when the media clearly attributes responsibility for the issue in question to a particular level. 
The key, according to Cutler, is that ‘the media are structured to provide separate reporting of 
each government’s actions’ (Cutler, 2017, p. 18). 
 
This section has drawn on the increasingly voluminous literature on responsibility 
attributions to show that citizens often find it difficult to identify which political actor is 
responsible for governmental outcomes. Institutional complexity, bias, and limited access to 
reliable information hinder citizens’ efforts to attribute responsibility and consequently limit 
the public’s ability to hold those in power to account. The discussion highlights the 
importance of examining responsibility attributions in settings where electoral accountability 
plays a key role in underpinning the legitimacy of the political system. The following section 
explains why it is particularly important to examine these issue in the context of Welsh 
devolution, and how evidence relating to Wales can help broaden understanding of the 
challenges faced by citizens when attributing responsibility.  
 
2. Devolved Wales as a case study  
The architects of devolution promised that it would reinvigorate democracy in Wales. The 
creation of an elected institution would give rise to a ‘new politics’ based on inclusiveness 
and consensual decision-making, and lead to better governance (Bradbury and Mitchell, 
2001; McAllister, 2000; McAllister and Cole 2007, 2014; Wyn Jones and Trystan, 2001). 
Principles such as ‘accessibility, representativeness, legitimacy, openness, participation, 
innovation, inclusiveness and accountability’ would lie at the heart of devolved politics, and 
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these values would be used as criteria for evaluating its performance (Chaney et al., 2001: 3). 
Several studies have examined the degree to which some of these aspirations have been met. 
 
The literature identifies some important successes. Since the introduction of devolved 
elections, the partisan composition of the devolved government has more accurately reflected 
the popular will in Wales (e.g. Scully and Larner, 2017). The use of fairly open candidate 
selection systems (Bradbury et al., 2000; Stirbu et al., 2018), and of the semi-proportional 
AMS electoral system, has led to the election of a chamber that has a far better gender 
balance than seen elsewhere in the UK (McAllister and Cole, 2007; 2014). Efforts to ‘widen 
participation in the governmental process’ have also been a success, with civil society groups 
‘far more intimately involved in the policy-making processes than is usually the case at the 
UK level’ (Wyn Jones and Trystan, 2001: 24–5; however see Chaney 2016). 
 
Performance on other measures has been weaker. There are few signs of any fundamental 
‘change in political culture’ (McAllister, 2000: 603; McAllister and Kay, 2010). The realities 
of electoral competition have prevented the development of a more consensual political 
culture, with the government–opposition dynamic evident in the Assembly from the outset 
(Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001; McAllister, 2000). Hopes that devolution would lead to 
distinctive policies for Wales have largely gone unrealised, as only some evidence of policy 
innovation has emerged (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001: 257; Williams, 2011). While the 
semi-proportional electoral system is an improvement on first-past-the-post, 
disproportionality is high (McAllister and Cole, 2007, 2014). Turnout is low, disappointing 
hopes of broad public participation in devolved politics (Wyn Jones and Trystan, 2001). 
Further, Scully and Wyn Jones (2015) demonstrate that while support for Welsh devolution 
has increased, the public legitimacy of the devolved institutions in Wales remains uncertain. 
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While the literature on Welsh devolution has made important strides forward, little is known 
about whether one of the key promises of devolution – strong electoral accountability – has 
been fulfilled. Examining the strength of electoral accountability is important in any 
democratic setting, and particularly so in Wales. The claim that an accountability deficit 
exists in Wales is prevalent and made by high profile politicians (BBC News, 2012) and 
scholars (Cushion and Scully, 2016). Few people in Wales consume news created in Wales 
(Thomas et al., 2004; Cushion and Scully, 2016), and coverage of devolved politics in Wales 
by the London-based news media (widely consumed in Wales) is limited (McAllister and 
Cole, 2014: 182). The result, it is argued, is that public understanding of devolution is too 
limited for voters to be able to hold those in power to account.4  
 
While this claim is plausible given the particular attribution challenges which apply in Wales 
(discussed below), the evidential basis for making such a claim is currently problematic in 
two ways. First, it is primarily based on inferences made relating to patterns of media 
consumption in Wales, rather than on direct measures of public understanding of devolution. 
Second, the issue of whether citizens draw on their knowledge of devolution when voting has 
not been examined. Our study innovates by addressing both issues. We draw on data relating 
to responsibility attributions to examine whether citizens can make informed use of their 
vote; we also examine whether attributions shape voting behaviour. This approach provides a 
stronger empirical basis for making claims relating to the strength of accountability 
specifically in Wales. It also enables us to develop understanding of the link between media 
consumption and responsibility attributions more generally. 
                                                
4 The literature also raises concerns about the strength of accountability within the Assembly. 
The ability of the Assembly’s committees to provide effective scrutiny is limited due to the 
chamber’s small size and the heavy workload of AMs (UK’s Changing Union, undated; The 
Expert Panel on Assembly Electoral Reform, 2017). 
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Three considerations may present particular attribution challenges to Welsh voters: ‘the 
chronic lack of clarity in the division of powers’ between the devolved and the UK levels 
(Wyn Jones and Trystan, 2001: 25) which has persisted despite continual reform of the Welsh 
constitution (Wyn Jones, 2016); the novel institutional design whereby there was initially no 
separation of powers between the executive and the legislature (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001: 
270–1); and the frequent changes made to devolved constitutional arrangements (e.g. 
McAllister and Cole, 2007; 2014). 
 
When established in 1999, the Assembly was given the powers previously exercised by the 
Secretary of State for Wales. These included control over the expenditure of the Welsh block 
grant and the ability to pass secondary legislation within the framework of primary legislation 
passed by the UK Parliament (Taylor et al., 1999: xxx). The Assembly was not given ‘even 
theoretical fiscal autonomy’ (Bradbury and Mitchell, 2001: 270). While it had ‘responsibility 
for the day-to-day running of services like health and education’, its lack of primary 
legislative powers meant that ‘it would not have the ability to change the major structure or 
objectives of those services’ (Taylor et al., 1999: xxxi). The Assembly was reliant on the UK 
Parliament in two key ways: for determining the size of its budget and to pass primary 
legislation on its behalf. Scholars roundly criticised these arrangements, Wyn Jones and 
Trystan describing the settlement as ‘a system of Byzantine complexity’ (2001: 46; see also 
McAllister 2000: 603; Bradbury and Mitchell 2001: 247). The ‘vertical’ division of 
responsibility between the devolved and the UK level has been unclear from the outset. 
 
These problems were compounded by the unclear ‘horizontal’ division of powers at the 
devolved level. The National Assembly for Wales was initially established as a corporate 
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body, with no legal separation of power between a legislative and an executive body, and 
with the institution as a whole being formally responsible for all decisions. A de facto shift 
occurred in the early years of the Assembly, and the Government of Wales (2006) Act 
formalized the separation of powers between the legislature (the National Assembly for 
Wales) and the executive (the Welsh Government). Ambiguities relating to the horizontal 
division of powers between devolved institutions may have hindered efforts to attribute 
responsibility at the crucial time when citizens were first learning about devolution. 
 
Devolved powers have been modified several times since 1999. Lines of responsibility 
remained blurred under the second model of devolution created by the Government of Wales 
(2006) Act. Under the new Legislative Competence Order (LCO) procedure, the Assembly 
could ask the UK Parliament for the right to make primary legislation on predefined issues 
(McAllister and Cole, 2007: 537). Primary legislative powers were now being transferred 
from London to Cardiff gradually and on an ad hoc basis, presenting new attribution 
challenges for citizens. Lines of responsibility became clearer in 2011, when powers to make 
primary legislation in devolved areas were granted to Wales following a referendum (Wyn 
Jones and Scully, 2012). Two further Wales Acts in 2014 and 2017 revised constitutional 
arrangements further. The 2014 Act devolved limited taxation powers to Wales for the first 
time; the 2017 Act modified how powers are devolved to Wales, prompting a change from 
the conferred powers model to the reserved powers model of devolution. Despite the 
strengthening of devolved powers, the arrangements still resemble a ‘marble cake’ model of 
federalism more than the ‘layer cake’ model that citizens find easier to understand. Further, it 
is unclear whether citizens have been able to keep track of these constitutional changes. 
 
3. Aims, contribution, and data 
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With these considerations in mind, this study examines three issues: whether citizens in 
Wales are able to attribute responsibility accurately, which factors are linked to their 
(in)ability to do so, and whether citizens draw on their attributions when voting. The study 
makes three primary contributions. First, we provide the first systematic evaluation of 
whether Welsh devolution has delivered on the promise of strong electoral accountability. In 
so doing, we test the prevalent claim that devolved Wales suffers from an accountability 
deficit and provide a more rigorous empirical basis for debates on this issue. Second, we 
identify whether understanding of devolution is particularly limited within certain social 
groups. This provides an indication of whether efforts at educating the public should focus on 
specific sections of society. Third, the study makes a broader contribution to the literature on 
responsibility attributions. Our findings inform understanding of how citizens deal with the 
attribution challenges presented in settings where constitutional change is frequent and the 
consumption of indigenous media low. 
 
The analysis that follows draws on data from the 2016 Welsh Election Study (WES).5 This is 
the most comprehensive survey of the Welsh electorate ever undertaken and is the latest in a 
series of major surveys conducted to coincide with devolved elections in Wales. This series 
has provided the basis for the bulk of research on electoral behaviour in Wales, including the 
standard work on voting behaviour at the 2016 Welsh election (Scully and Larner, 2017). 
WES is a three-wave panel survey conducted online by YouGov around the time of the 
devolved election, held on 5 May 2016. The pre-election wave was conducted 7–18 March, 
the election wave was conducted 5 April–4 May, and the post-election wave was conducted 
6–22 May. A total of 2,115 responded to all three waves, while 3,272 individuals responded 
to the first and largest wave. The questionnaires included survey items specifically relating to 
                                                
5 Standard survey weights have been applied in the analysis to ensure that the sample used is 
representative of the adult population in Wales. 
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responsibility attributions. These were worded to mirror questions successfully administered 
in other settings and which form the basis of major studies dealing with similar issues (e.g. 
Johns, 2011; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014). Consequently, unlike previous work (Cushion and 
Scully, 2016), we need not rely on inferences relating to media consumption and can directly 
examine the three issues that are of interest: the accuracy of attributions, the factors linked to 
variance in the accuracy of attributions, and whether voters draw on their attributions when 
voting. In short, the survey provides an unusually rich data source for examining the state of 
electoral accountability in Wales. 
 
4. The accuracy of responsibility attributions in devolved Wales 
To what extent are people in Wales able to attribute political responsibility accurately? We 
investigate this issue by examining whether citizens can identify two issues: which level of 
government has responsibility for key policy areas, and the partisan composition of the 
Welsh Government in the period leading up to the 2016 election. This section draws on the 
second wave of WES, conducted during the election campaign. 
 
Before presenting the findings, it is worth noting that more than half of respondents (61.8%) 
agreed with the statement that ‘it is often difficult to figure out which level of government is 
responsible for what’. More than a third (36.9%) stated that the election campaign had 
provided them with insufficient information ‘to make an informed choice’. This provides 
initial grounds for concern, given that this survey wave was conducted in the days leading up 
to the election. 
 
At the aggregate level, respondents correctly attributed responsibility for major policy areas. 
Table 1 shows that the majority of respondents identified that responsibility for the two key 
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devolved policy areas, health (64.4%) and education (58.6%), lies with the Welsh 
Government, and that responsibility for foreign policy (77.5%) and taxation (78.1%) lies at 
the UK level. There is much confusion regarding whether responsibility for law and order has 
been devolved, although a plurality (47.5%) correctly ascribed responsibility for this to the 
UK level. Despite the fairly positive general trend, a considerable proportion of the Welsh 
electorate did not identify that health and education are devolved competences. This is 
despite the fact that the Welsh Government spends almost half of its entire budget on health 
and that education is its third largest budgetary item (Welsh Government, 2017). 
 
[Table 1] 
 
To ascertain whether citizens could identify the partisan composition of the Welsh 
Government, respondents were asked ‘As far as you are aware, which party or parties have 
had ministers in the Welsh Government between 2011 and now?’ Respondents could select 
as many parties as they wished, and had 30 seconds to answer as is customary with survey 
questions which test knowledge. The ‘don’t know’ option was available. 
 
Table 2 shows that only around 1 in 6 (16.0%) could identify that Labour governed alone in 
the period leading up to the 2016 election. More than a third of respondents (39.4%) were 
apparently unaware that Labour – the long-time dominant party in Wales – was in 
government at all. While more than half of respondents (60.8%) identified Labour as a party 
of government in Wales, it appears that many citizens were confused about the partisan 
composition of the Welsh Government and/or were under the impression that it comprised of 
multiple parties: 69.5% believed that a coalition government was in power at the devolved 
level in Wales at a time of single party government. 
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[Table 2] 
 
The findings obtained so far present a bleak picture. While many citizens in Wales were able 
to identify that responsibilities for key policy areas are devolved, a large minority could not. 
Even more alarming is the finding that the overwhelming majority of citizens in Wales could 
not identify the partisan composition of the single-party government. The findings suggest 
that a vast proportion of citizens in Wales do not have the knowledge required to hold those 
in power at the devolved level to account.  
 
5. Explaining variation in the accuracy of responsibility attributions  
The findings presented above indicate that there is at least some, and potentially considerable, 
variation in citizens’ understanding of devolution. The next task is to identify which factors 
are linked with citizens’ (in)ability to attribute responsibility correctly. This helps us to 
understand whether certain groups are in a stronger position than others to use elections as an 
accountability mechanism, and whether initiatives aimed at improving public knowledge of 
devolution should therefore target specific groups. 
 
We report findings from two multivariate models that explore the predictors of knowledge of 
devolved politics (Table 3). Model 1 examines knowledge of devolved competences. The 
dependent variable is based on an additive score, with each respondent awarded a point for 
each correct answer to the question ‘which level of government is mainly responsible for the 
following policy areas?’: health, education, law and order, foreign policy, and taxation. The 
minimum score is zero and the maximum is five. Since this dependent variable counts the 
number of correct answers given by respondents, we estimate a Poisson regression, which is 
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appropriate for this type of data. Model 2 examines knowledge of the partisan composition of 
the Welsh Government. The binary dependent variable indicates whether the respondent 
could identify that Labour governed alone and prompts the use of logistic regression as the 
estimation technique.6 
 
The specifications of the two regression models are identical. We include three sets of 
independent variables. The first set presents the standard socio-demographic variables: age7, 
whether there are children present in the household, education level, gender, housing status, 
marital status, and social class. This provides a means of testing whether older, wealthier, 
married, better-educated, and male citizens are more knowledgeable about politics in Wales 
as they are found to be in other settings.  
 
The second set of independent variables relates to the experience of living in Wales and to 
issues of culture and identity. We include variables relating to the respondent’s place of birth, 
Welsh language ability, and national identity, as is customary when exploring issues relating 
to public attitudes and participation in Wales (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012). In light of 
findings that constitutional preferences are linked to attitudes and evaluations (Hobolt and 
Tilley, 2014; Johns, 2011), we also control for respondents’ constitutional preferences. 
 
The third set of predictors focus on political interest, engagement and outlook. The dummy 
variable ‘Welsh media consumption’ indicates whether the respondent consumes any TV, 
                                                
6 For summary statistics and replication materials see Supplementary Material.  
7 We include both a squared and a cubed term for respondent age to account for potential 
differences across age groups and the likely non-linear relationship between age and political 
knowledge.  
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radio, or print news media created in Wales.8 This provides a means of examining whether 
knowledge levels are higher among those who consume at least some news from Welsh 
sources. We also include a self-reported measure of political interest, a self-reported measure 
of respondents’ likelihood to vote, a series of party identification dummy variables, and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the respondent was contacted by any party during the 
election campaign. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
The key finding is that, contrary to expectations, few factors are linked with higher 
knowledge levels. There is no indication that certain socio-demographic factors, including 
age, class, or housing status affect the accuracy of attributions. The attributions of women 
who do not live in a household with children are just as accurate as those of men. Knowledge 
levels are lower among those who are married or have a partner, and those who have no 
experience of higher education. 
 
It is particularly striking that there is no clear link between knowledge of devolution and 
several factors relating to experiences of Welsh life. Those who speak at least some Welsh 
are no more knowledgeable than non-Welsh speakers. We identify no link between 
respondents’ preferred constitutional status and their ability to assign responsibility correctly, 
in contrast to findings in other multi-level contexts (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Johns, 2011). 
Those who have a stronger Welsh identity are more likely to identify that Labour governed 
alone than British identifiers. However, in terms of their ability to identify devolved 
competences, there are no differences between Welsh and British identifiers or between those 
                                                
8 This does not take any consumption of online news media generated in Wales into account, 
since the survey data does not enable us to create a reliable measure in relation to this issue. 
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born in Wales and those who have moved to Wales later in life. Surprisingly, those who were 
born outside Wales are more likely to be able to identify that Labour governed alone than 
respondents born in Wales. This may be because differences between Wales and the rest of 
the UK may be more starkly noticeable for those who have lived in Wales and elsewhere in 
the UK.  
 
It is highly noteworthy that consumption of any news media generated in Wales has no effect 
on the accuracy of attributions, in contrast to findings obtained in other settings (Cutler, 
2017; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). This presents a challenge to the claim that the low 
consumption of indigenous Welsh news media is the main cause of the limited awareness of 
devolved governance in Wales. This finding also provides grounds for questioning the 
assumption that knowledge levels would increase if more people consumed Welsh news. 
 
The findings suggest that electoral campaigning can increase levels of public knowledge of 
devolution. Respondents who were contacted by any party during the campaign period are 
more likely to correctly identify the composition of government. However, there is no 
evidence that campaign contact is linked to increased awareness of the division of 
competences. With regard to party affiliation, there is little evidence that understanding is 
higher among party identifiers, although knowledge of the division of powers is higher 
among Conservative and Liberal Democrat supporters. 
 
Unsurprisingly, knowledge is higher among those with a greater interest in politics and those 
who are more likely to vote in devolved elections. It is significant that those who know less 
about devolved politics are less likely to vote: not only does the finding contrast with the 
situation in Northern Ireland (Garry, 2014), but it also suggests that those who do not 
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understand devolution do not engage with elections, a key feature of Wales’ so-called 
‘participatory’ new democracy (Chaney et al., 2001). 
 
What the multivariate analysis makes clear is that few groups within the population are 
distinctly less knowledgeable than others. If the solution to the problem identified in the 
previous section – limited knowledge – is to take steps to improve public understanding of 
devolution, these findings provide no clear guide as to where such efforts should be targeted. 
Knowledge levels are lowest among those who are least interested in politics; this suggests 
that it is those who need reaching the most are also those who are the most difficult to reach. 
A further point of concern is the finding that those who are less politically engaged are not 
only less likely to vote, but also less likely to be able to use their vote well. Finally, the 
findings suggest that increased consumption of news media created in Wales may not lead to 
increased public understanding of devolution, as many assume (BBC News, 2012; Cushion 
and Scully, 2016). 
 
6. The effect of responsibility attributions on electoral behaviour in Wales 
So far we have examined one specific aspect of the health of electoral accountability in 
Wales: whether citizens possess sufficient information to hold those in power to account. In 
this section we examine a separate aspect: whether voters in Wales use their vote to punish or 
reward those they believe are in power, even if they are operating on the basis of inaccurate 
information. In other words, we examine whether responsibility attributions have a 
moderating effect on vote choice. If retrospective voting operates in Wales, the problem is 
solely one of knowledge, and the remedy must focus on increasing public awareness of 
devolution. However, if performance evaluations do not shape electoral behaviour, then 
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devolved elections in Wales are undermined by a dual problem: that citizens have neither the 
information nor the inclination to use their vote to hold those in power to account. 
 
We examine this issue in two ways. First, we consider whether voters engage in retrospective 
voting by rewarding or punishing those they believe are in government on the basis of 
performance evaluations. This provides a means of testing whether voters still attempt to vote 
retrospectively, even if they reward or sanction the incorrect party (Fortunato and Stevenson, 
2013). Second, we examine whether the most knowledgable voters – those who could 
identify that Labour governed alone – vote retrospectively. We investigate these issues by 
constructing two binary logistic regression models, presented in Table 4. 
 
Model 1 takes a dependent variable that identifies whether the respondent voted for one of 
the parties that they thought had been in government in Wales during the previous term.9 The 
model is specified in the same way as the models presented in Section 4, apart from the 
addition of two independent variables which account for respondents’ performance 
evaluation of health and education. Respondents were asked if they thought the standard of 
healthcare in the NHS and the standard of education had fallen, with higher scores indicating 
that the respondent thought that the standard had fallen. These two policy areas have been 
selected because they are highly salient devolved policy areas: of the policy areas where 
responsibility lies primarily at the devolved level, health and education are the two that 
Welsh citizens stated as being the ‘most important … in the upcoming Welsh Assembly 
election’ (Scully, 2016). It is therefore reasonable to assume that it is on their evaluations of 
government performance in these policy areas that Welsh voters draw when voting at 
devolved elections, if voters draw on evaluations relating to any devolved policy areas.  
                                                
9 We draw on data from the post-election wave in this section. Non-voters are excluded from 
the analysis. 
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Our sole interest lies in the results relating to the health and education variables: a positive 
and statistically significant effect would indicate that citizens draw on performance 
evaluations when deciding how to vote. In the event, Model 1 provides non-significant 
findings for the health and education variables. This indicates that citizens do not draw on 
their evaluations of government performance in these two key policy areas when voting. 
 
[Table 4] 
 
Model 2 takes a binary dependent variable which identifies whether the respondent voted for 
Labour or for any other party. The model is specified as Model 1, with three additions: a 
dummy variable indicating knowledge of Labour being in government alone, and interaction 
terms between this knowledge variable on the one hand and policy assessments in health and 
education on the other. Our interest is in whether there is an interaction between being aware 
that Labour governed alone and evaluations of health and/or education. A statistically 
significant coefficient for this interaction would indicate that the best-informed citizens draw 
on performance evaluations when deciding how to vote; the converse finding would indicate 
that even the best-informed citizens do not vote retrospectively. In the event, Model 2 
provides non-significant findings on the interaction terms. This indicates that knowledgeable 
voters in Wales do not draw on their evaluations of government performance in the two 
highly salient areas of health and education when voting at devolved elections.  
 
The key finding that emerges from these models is that retrospective voting is not a 
discernible feature of electoral behaviour in Wales, at least not in relation to the two key 
devolved issues of health and education. Voters in Wales do not draw on their evaluations of 
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government performance in these two key policy areas when voting and therefore do not use 
their vote to sanction or reward those they believe are in government. The typical voter is just 
as likely to vote for a governing party whether or not they approve of the government’s 
record on health and education. Even more knowledgeable voters, those who can identify that 
Labour governed alone, do not vote retrospectively. These voters, again, are just as likely to 
vote for or against Labour regardless of what they think about the government’s performance 
in these two key policy areas. 
 
7. Conclusion 
A key rationale for creating elected institutions at the devolved level in Wales in 1999 was to 
strengthen accountability. Yet claims that there remains an accountability deficit in Wales 
remain prevalent. This study has explored the state of electoral accountability at the devolved 
level in Wales. We structured the investigation to reflect the notion that to use elections as a 
sanctioning mechanism citizens must be able to assign responsibility accurately and must 
vote retrospectively. We examined whether citizens can identify the key competences of 
devolved policy-makers, what factors underpin their ability to do so, and whether voters draw 
on their evaluations of governmental performance when voting. 
 
Our findings are as alarming as they are consistent. A surprisingly large proportion of citizens 
in Wales do not possess basic knowledge of devolved governance. A substantial minority are 
unable to identify key devolved policy areas, while the overwhelming majority cannot 
accurately identify the composition of the government.10 Since few groups are identified as 
                                                
10 While this article is primarily interested in the current state of affairs, it is likely that 
findings relating to the 2016 election also apply in relation to previous elections. The key 
factors identified by the literature as undermining citizens’ efforts to attribute responsibility 
are the complexity of the distribution of power both between levels of governance and 
between actors operating at the same level of governance, and the presence of a coalition 
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being less knowledgeable than others, it will take more to address these problems than simply 
targeting specific groups within the population. It is the least engaged politically that find the 
task of attributing responsibility most challenging, and this group may be the hardest to 
reach. Crucially, Welsh voters do not appear to draw on their evaluations of government 
performance when voting. Voters are just as willing to vote for a party they believe are in 
government regardless of whether they are satisfied with government performance. Even the 
more knowledgeable voters, those who can identify the partisan composition of the 
government, do not vote retrospectively. In short, there is an acute accountability deficit at 
the devolved level in Wales. It stems from a twin problem: many citizens do not have the 
information required to hold those in power to account, and many do not use their vote to 
sanction poor performance. Retrospective voting is not a discernible feature of electoral 
behaviour in Wales.  
 
Beyond the study of electoral politics in Wales, this study provides significant insights for 
scholars working on issues relating to responsibility attributions and multi-level governance. 
Exploring new terrain, we have identified a sub-state setting in which citizens struggle to 
attribute responsibility accurately and in which attributions do not moderate the effect of 
policy evaluations on vote choice. Our finding that knowledge of the partisan composition of 
government is extremely limited in Wales serves as a reminder that scholars should not take 
for granted that citizens know which party or parties are in government, even in settings 
                                                                                                                                                  
government. Attributing responsibility has become marginally easier for Welsh voters over 
time: the transfer of primary legislative powers to Wales following the 2011 election clarified 
at which level of government power lies; the formal separation of power between the 
executive and legislative branches has made devolved politics easier to understand. The fact 
that the 2016 election (like the 2007 election) followed a period of single-party government 
should have made it easier than it was in 2003 and 2011 for citizens to identify the 
composition of government. If few voters could identify the competences and composition of 
Wales’ devolved government in 2016, it is unlikely that more could do so previously. 
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featuring single-party governments (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013). The study provides 
further evidence that consumption of relevant news media does not always facilitate 
understanding of governance (cf. Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; 
Cutler, 2017). Further work is required to identify how the institutional context, the focus of 
the media, and the nature of elections shape the ability of citizens to attribute responsibility.  
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Table 1: Policy responsibility attributions (Wave 2, pre-election) 
Statistic UK Wales Other DK N 
Health  15.1% 64.4% 2.4% 18.1% 2,277 
Education 13.6% 58.6% 10.6% 17.2% 2,277 
Law and order  47.4% 29.3% 4.5% 18.8% 2,277 
Foreign policy  77.5% 1.9% 5.4% 15.2% 2,277 
Taxation 78.1% 3.9% 2.8% 15.1% 2,277 
 
 
Table 2: Identifying parties in government 
Parties with ministers in government 
Conservatives 34.0% 
Green Party 5.8% 
Labour 60.8% 
Liberal Democrats 24.3% 
Plaid Cymru 41.4% 
UKIP 4.1% 
Don’t know 28.8% 
-  
Labour in government alone 16.0% 
Labour in government, but in coalition 44.6% 
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Some form of coalition11 69.5% 
N 2277 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Modelling political knowledge 
 Model 1: 
Knowledge of 
division of 
competences 
Model 2: 
Knowledge that 
Labour governed 
alone 
 Poisson Logistic 
Age -0.011 (0.024) 0.020 (0.118) 
Age (sq) 0.0005 (0.001) -0.0004 (0.002) 
Age (cubed) -0.00000 
(0.00000) 
0.00000 (0.00002) 
Social class 
grouping: AB 
0.055 (0.040) 0.145 (0.206) 
Social class 
grouping: C1 
-0.020 (0.037) 0.267 (0.190) 
Social class 
grouping: C2 
-0.010 (0.041) -0.003 (0.223) 
Homeowner 0.041 (0.036) -0.006 (0.183) 
Higher 
education 
0.021 (0.029) 0.410*** (0.149) 
Married or 
partnered 
-0.050* (0.030) -0.326** (0.155) 
Woman -0.057 (0.064) -1.010*** (0.347) 
                                                
11 Any type of coalition – regardless of whether Labour is included. 
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No children in 
household 
0.099** (0.049) 0.012 (0.229) 
Born in Wales 0.017 (0.035) -0.321* (0.175) 
Welsh language 
ability 
0.016 (0.024) 0.046 (0.122) 
More British 
than Welsh 
0.003 (0.004) -0.030* (0.018) 
Preferred 
constitutional 
status 
0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) 
Greens (id) 0.065 (0.083) -0.667 (0.477) 
UKIP (id) -0.020 (0.055) -0.248 (0.285) 
Plaid Cymru 
(id) 
0.085 (0.056) -0.271 (0.284) 
LibDem (id) 0.132** (0.064) -0.112 (0.335) 
Labour (id) 0.037 (0.040) -0.029 (0.199) 
Conservative 
(id) 
0.079* (0.043) -0.184 (0.223) 
Any Welsh 
media 
consumed 
0.009 (0.029) 0.058 (0.150) 
Interest in 
politics 
0.082*** (0.018) 0.234** (0.096) 
Contacted by 
any party 
0.025 (0.028) 0.296** (0.142) 
Likelihood of 
voting 
0.026*** (0.006) 0.089*** (0.032) 
Woman*No 
children in 
-0.015 (0.070) 0.127 (0.379) 
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household 
Constant 0.966*** (0.373) -1.791 (1.822) 
   
Observations 1,781 1,781 
Log Likelihood -2,886.22 -616.858 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,826.45 1,287.72 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Modelling political accountability 
 Model 1: Vote for party 
respondent thought was in 
government 
Model 2: Voted 
Labour (incumbent) 
Age 0.232 (0.166) 0.444** (0.207) 
Age (sq) -0.004 (0.004) -0.008* (0.004) 
Age (cubed) 0.00002 (0.00002) 0.00004 (0.00003) 
Social class grouping: AB -0.042 (0.294) 0.579 (0.371) 
Social class grouping: C1 -0.079 (0.270) -0.274 (0.344) 
Social class grouping: C2 -0.024 (0.306) -0.105 (0.393) 
Homeowner 0.608** (0.268) -0.567 (0.347) 
Higher education 0.415** (0.209) -0.026 (0.274) 
Married or partnered 0.054 (0.231) 0.228 (0.295) 
Woman 0.082 (0.202) -0.177 (0.263) 
No children in household 0.382 (0.281) -0.113 (0.354) 
Born in Wales -0.046 (0.250) -0.306 (0.336) 
Welsh lang. ability 0.073 (0.171) 0.170 (0.223) 
More British than Welsh -0.015 (0.025) -0.045 (0.034) 
Preferred constitutional status 0.007* (0.004) -0.001 (0.005) 
Greens (id) 1.605 (1.033) 1.157 (0.889) 
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UKIP (id) -2.000*** (0.630) -2.530** (1.061) 
Plaid Cymru (id) 0.345 (0.371) -2.223*** (0.570) 
LibDem (id) 0.312 (0.432) -0.666 (0.538) 
Labour (id) 1.300*** (0.306) 2.647*** (0.345) 
Conservative (id) 0.340 (0.340) -1.169** (0.463) 
Any Welsh media consumed 0.249 (0.222) -0.557* (0.29) 
Interest in politics 0.059 (0.134) 0.136 (0.181) 
Contacted by any party 0.050 (0.201) -0.099 (0.262) 
Likelihood of voting 0.242*** (0.074) 0.026 (0.103) 
NHS: standard fallen -0.223 (0.145) 0.029 (0.464) 
Education: standard fallen -0.076 (0.153) -0.201 (0.454) 
Knowledge of Labour in gov.  1.121 (1.198) 
Knowledge of Labour in gov. * NHS: standard 
fallen 
 -0.400 (0.503) 
Knowledge of Labour in gov. * Education: 
standard fallen 
 -0.145 (0.498) 
Constant -6.190** (2.719) -7.271** (3.419) 
Observations 754 754 
Log Likelihood -306.465 -205.995 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 668.929 473.99 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01  
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